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CASES NOTED
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF SECURITIES DEALERS,
INC. v. SEC-NATIONAL BANKS MAY
SELL MUTUAL FUNDS
The Comptroller of the Currency issued revised Regulation 9,' au-
thorizing the commingling of managing agency accounts2 by national
banks under their fiduciary powers. The First National City Bank sub-
mitted the first proposal for such an account, and it was approved by
the Comptroller. In addition, the Federal Reserve System ruled that
the proposed arrangement would not violate section 32 of the Banking
Act of 1933.8
The Investment Company Institute (ICI) 4 filed suit against the
Comptroller and the First National City Bank in United States District
Court5 seeking a declaratory judgment to invalidate the provisions in
Regulation 9 which authorized the commingling of the managing agency
accounts under fiduciary powers of national banks. The district court
concluded that ICI had standing to sue the Comptroller and found in
favor of ICI on several grounds: (1) the commingled managing agency
account involves the contractual principal-agent relationship and is not
a fiduciary activity within the purview of Section 92a of the Federal
Reserve Act; 6 (2) the issuance of "units of participation" to investors
in the account involved the Bank in the business of dealing in securities
for its own account in violation of sections 167 and 218 of the Glass-
Steagall Act; and (3) the relation between the Bank and the account
1. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1963).
2. By commingling managing agency accounts, national banks can create the functional
equivalent of an open-end mutual fund. An open-end mutual fund continuously issues
shares which are redeemable upon presentation by the shareholder to the extent of his
proportionate share of the company's current net assets or the cash equivalent thereof.
This redeemability feature distinguishes the open-end mutual fund from the closed-end in-
vestment company.
3. 12 C.F.R. § 218.11 (1963). The Banking Act is found in its original form in 48
Stat. 684 (1933).
4. The Investment Company Institute is a trade association of the mutual fund in-
dustry composed of 159 registered, open-end management investment companies, under-
writers, and investment advisors to those companies.
5. Investment Company Institute v. Camp, 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
6. 76 Stat. 668 (1962), 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964) authorizes the Comptroller to grant
national banks "the right to act as trustee, executor, administrator, registrar of stocks and
bonds, guardian of estates, assignee, receiver, committee of estates of lunatics or in any
other fiduciary capacity in which State banks . . . are permitted to act under the law of
the State in which the national bank is located."
7. 48 Stat. 184 (1933), as amended 12 U.S.C. § 24 (1964) provides in part that a na-
tional bank shall not underwrite any issues of securities or stock.
8. 48 Stat. 189 (1933), as amended 49 Stat. 707 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1964) makes
it unlawful for any firm that is engaged in the business of issuing, selling, or underwriting
securities to engage in the business of receiving deposits.
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was an affiliation or interlocking directorate between a bank and an orga-
nization principally engaged in the securities business in violation of
sections 200 and 3210 of the Glass-Steagall Act.
The First National City Bank filed an application with the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission to register the proposed account as a
diversified open-end management investment company under the Invest-
ment Company Act of 1940." The Bank requested that it be exempted
from various provisions of the Investment Company Act (which prohibit
bank domination of an investment company) because the Comptroller
required that the Bank maintain effective control of the account in order
to comply with the banking laws.12 The SEC, over the objection of the
National Association of Securities Dealers, maintained that even a
specific prohibition against bank domination of an investment company
does not preclude an exemption pursuant to section 6(c).' 3 Accordingly,
it granted the exemptions, concluding that the risks of conflict of interest
would be adequately controlled by those provisions of the Investment
Company Act which remained applicable, supplemented by the Comp-
troller's regulations, and that the exemptions would permit the establish-
ment of a new and desirable investment medium.'4
9. 48 Stat. 188 (1933), as amended 49 Stat. 704, 707 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 377 (1964)
makes it unlawful for a member bank of the Federal Reserve System to be an affiliate of
any organization engaged principally in "the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale, or
distribution" of securities.
10. 48 Stat. 194 (1933), as amended 49 Stat. 709 (1935), 12 U.S.C. § 78 (1964) pro-
hibits a director, officer, or employee of a member bank from serving in a similar capacity
with an organization "primarily engaged in the issue, flotation, underwriting, public sale,
or distribution, at wholesale or retail, or through syndicate participation, of stocks, bonds
or other similar activities."
11. 54 Stat. 789 (1940), as amended 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)(1)(52) (1958), as amended 15
U.S.C. § 80(a)(2)(39) (Supp. V, 1964).
12. The principal exemptions sought were from sections 10(b)(3), 10(c), and 10(d)(2)
of the Act. Section 10(b)(3) provides that an investment company shall not have an in-
vestment banker as a member of its board unless a majority of the board are not investment
bankers. Section 10(c) provides that an investment company may not have a majority of
the board who are directors or officers of any one bank. Section 10(d) (2) requires that
the investment advisor be engaged principally in the business of rendering investment
supervisory services. The SEC granted the exemptions from sections 10(c) and 10(b)(3)
but refused to grant an exemption from section 10(d)(2). This arrangement permits no
more than 60% of the directors of the account to be affiliated with the bank.
13. Section 6(c) provides that the SEC may exempt any person from any provision
of the Act "if and to the extent that such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the
public interest and consistent with the protection of investors and purposes fairly intended
by the policy and provisions of the Act."
14. A good discussion of the events involved in the instant case is provided in the
concurring opinion of Bazelon, C.J., National Ass'n of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420
F.2d 83, 85-95 (D.C. Cir. 1969). In addition, the order of the SEC which is the subject of
one of these appeals has been reviewed in several legal periodicals. See Lehr, The Affil-
iation of Commercial Bank and Mutual Fund Personnel, 10 ST. Louis L.J. 190 (1965);
Comment, Of Banks and Mutual Funds: The Collective Investment Trust, 20 Sw. L.J. 334
(1966); Comment, Banks, Trusts and Investment Companies: The Commingled Investment
Fund, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 1276 (1967); Comment, Regulation of Bank-Operated Collective
Funds-Judicial or Legislative Resolution of an Administrative Controversy?, 73 YAMx
L.J. 1249 (1964).
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The Court of Appeals consolidated the petition of the National
Association of Securities Dealers 5 for review of the SEC order 6 and
the appeal of the judgment and order of the district court in Investment
Co. Institute v. Camp."' Reversing the district court decision in the lat-
ter case and affirming the order of the SEC, the court held: The actions
taken by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Comptroller
are fully consonant with the statutes committed to their regulatory ju-
risdiction. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. Securities
and Exchange Commission, 420 F.2d 83 (D.C. Cir. 1969).1
I. THE BACKGROUND OF THE CASE
In 1962, the authority to permit national banks to act as trustees
and in other fiduciary capacities and to regulate their exercise of such
powers was transferred from the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System to the Comptroller. 9 The Comptroller, who clearly be-
lieved that the only restriction on bank services should be a concern for
risks to the solvency of the banks, immediately opened the door to diver-
sification by national banks.20 In April 1963, the Comptroller issued
revised Regulation 9 authorizing the commingling of managing agency
accounts under the fiduciary powers of national banks.2'
Prior to 1963, many national banks offered managing agency ac-
counts which provided investment advisory service to individual cus-
15. The National Association of Securities Dealers is a trade association representing
about 3,700 registered brokers or securities dealers.
16. First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March
9, 1966).
17. 274 F. Supp. 624 (D.D.C. 1967).
18. Vacating National Association of Security Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 36 U.S.L.W. 2312
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 1967) upon an en banke rehearing.
19. Act of Sept. 28, 1962, 76 Stat. 668, 12 U.S.C. § 92a (1964).
20. Since 1962, national banks have rapidly expanded their services to include:
(1) Electronic data processing;
(2) Subsidiary corporations;




(7) Travel agencies; and
(8) Off-premises activities.
Many competitors have sought to enjoin these services as ultra vires. Their attempts have
generally been impeded by a morass of legal problems, particularly the lack of standing
to sue the Comptroller. See, e.g., Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 408 F.2d 1147 (1st Cir.
1969); Saxon v. Georgia Ass'n of Independent Ins. Agents, 399 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1968);
Port of N.Y. Authority v. Baker, Watts & Co., 392 F.2d 497 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Association
of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 279 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1968), appeal docketed,
No. 19,218, 8th Cir., Feb. 23, 1968. The legal limits to the expansion of national bank
services are today unresolved, and scholarly opinion is mixed concerning appropriate bound-
aries. See Beatty, What are the Legal Limits to the Expansion of National Bank Services?,
86 BANKINO L.J. 3 (1969); Kirst, Diversification of National Banks, 21 STAN. L. Rv.
650 (1969).
21. 12 C.F.R. § 9.18 (1963).
1970]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXIV
tomers, but the minimum account economically feasible for a bank to
manage was generally in excess of $100,000.22 By commingling funds the
banks could offer their services to smaller investors and create the func-
tional equivalent of an open-end mutual fund.
The SEC claimed that such accounts would involve the sale of se-
curities and subject the bank to the securities laws.23 The banking
interests protested the SEC regulation, claiming that existing bank reg-
ulations were sufficient and dual regulation created an unnecessary and
impractical burden.
Through the efforts of the banking lobby, supported by the Comp-
troller,24 several bills began to appear in Congress which would exempt
banks' commingled agency accounts from regulation by the SEC.
The First National City Bank adopted a different approach, yield-
ing to SEC control, but seeking exemptions from provisions in the
Investment Company Act.25 The SEC sensed the potential success of
impending legislation freeing the banks from much needed SEC regula-
tion2" and granted the necessary exemptions,2 7 despite the opposition of
the mutual fund industry.2" The day following the SEC ruling, the Comp-
troller wrote to Senator Robertson, Chairman of the Senate Committee
on Banking and Currency, to withdraw his support for the McIntyre
Bill,29 effectively killing that legislation."
The mutual fund industry then brought these actions to prevent
the implementation by the First National City Bank of the proposed
account.
The court of appeals8' rendered a very brief per curiam decision.
Although a majority of the court had reservations about standing, 2 the
doubts were resolved in favor of reaching the merits to conclude that
both the Comptroller and the SEC acted within their authority. Chief
Judge Bazelon explained the reasoning of the court in a concurring opin-
22. Hearings on S. 2704 Bejore a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Banking and Cur-
rency, 89th Cong., 2d Sess., at 65 (1966) (hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings).
23. Statement of Manuel F. Cohen, 1966 Hearings at 180-86.
24. Letter from James J. Saxon to Senator Robertson, Jan. 20, 1964, 110 CONo. REc.
832 (1964).
25. Application of First Nat'l City Bank to the SEC, August 23, 1965, 1966 Hearings
at 180-86.
26. Statement of Manuel F. Cohen, 1966 Hearings at 180-86.
27. First National City Bank, SEC Investment Company Act Release No. 4538 (March
9, 1966), CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 77, 332.
28. Opposition to the Bank's application at the SEC hearing was led by the Invest-
ment Company Institute, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc., and the
Association of Mutual Fund Plan Sponsors, Inc.
29. S. 2704, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). This bill would have exempted bank collec-
tive investment funds from the application of the securities laws.
30. N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1966, at 30, col. 5.
31. The court consisted of Bazelon, C.J., Berger, J. (now Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States) and Miller, J.
32. The court originally dismissed this matter for lack of standing on the part of the
petitioners. 36 U.S.L.W. 2312 (D.C. Cir. Nov. 21, 1967) upon an en banke rehearing. Upon
rehearing that decision was vacated by the decision under discussion in this note.
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ion, and Judge Berger discussed the doubts as to standing in a second
concurring opinion in which he was joined by Judge Miller.
II. SUBSTANTIVE HOLDINGS
The court deliberately avoided invading the authority of the regu-
latory agencies and involving itself in a determination of economic
policy.83 Judge Bazelon, in explaining the validity of the account under
the banking and securities laws, reiterated the positions of the appropriate
regulatory agencies. The court found as follows:
(1) The difference between the traditional trust relationships and
the principal-agent relationship involved in the account does not alter
the fiduciary character of the duties owed to investors, and therefore
the account is a fiduciary activity within the purview of § 92a of the
Federal Reserve Act; 
8 4
(2) The sections of the Glass-Steagall Act8 5 which prohibit banks
from dealing in securities for its own account were only intended to pre-
clude the bank from risking its own assets in securities and do not pro-
hibit the purchase of securities for the account of others as would be done
under the account;
(3) The account is merely a department of the bank 6 except for
the purposes of the Investment Company Act (which prohibits bank
control of investment companies). Accordingly, the account does not
violate the provisions of the Glass-Steagall Act 87 forbidding bank affilia-
tion with an organization which is principally engaged in securities deal-
ings; and
(4) The SEC has the power under the Investment Company Act to
grant exemptions from any of its provisions.
(5) The provisions of the Investment Company Act which remain
applicable, supplemented by the Comptroller's regulations, adequately
protect against the four areas of possible conflict of interest cited by
opponents of the account. These include:
(a) retention of substantial cash deposits for the account in the
bank;
(b) use of account investments to shore up bank loans;
(c) purchase for the account of securities underwritten by the
bank; and
(d) allocation of brokerage to existing or potential bank customers.
33. See L. JAFFE, JUDiCIAL CONTROL OF AD aisTRATIv AcTiON (1965); Saferstein,
Nonreviewability: A Functional Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARv.
L. REV. 367 (1968). For cases concerning standards for judicial review of the Comptroller's
determinations, see Warren Bank v. Camp, 396 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1968); Security Bank v.
Saxon, 298 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. Mich. 1968).
34. See note 6 supra.
35. See notes 7 and 8 supra.
36. This "single entity" theory was promulgated as a regulation by the Federal Reserve
Board, 12 C.F.R. § 218.111 (1967).
37. See notes 9 and 10 supra.
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III. STANDING
The effect of this decision is to allow the governmental regulatory
agencies tremendous freedom in interpreting the banking and securities
laws. Despite its holding that the trade associations have standing to sue
the SEC and the Comptroller, 8 the court does little to restrain the ac-
tivities of these regulatory agencies.
The finding that the ICI had standing to sue the Comptroller is so
cloaked in ambiguous terminology that its value as precedent for further
actions against the Comptroller is severely limited. While both concur-
ring opinions find that the ICI had standing, their approaches to this
conclusion represent opposite poles of the spectrum of judicial philos-
ophy. Moreover, either approach could provide a cornerstone for the
future development of the uncertain law of standing.
Judge Bazelon analyzed the cases granting competitors standing to
sue the Comptroller and concurred with the results achieved, but at-
tempted to base the granting of standing on a more realistic foundation
than the reasoning of prior cases. In those cases, which granted stand-
ing, the courts found in certain provisions of the banking laws an implied
intent of Congress to protect insurance agents and data processing com-
panies from bank competition. Noting that Congress in writing the
banking laws was not concerned with aggrieved non-bank competitors,
but rather with protecting banks and their depositors' fortunes, Judge
Bazelon wrote:
I agree that the insurance agents and the data processors in
these two cases did have standing, but I am not persuaded that
the specific provisions relied upon by the courts were intended
to create protected classes of competitors any more than the
Glass-Steagall Act was intended to benefit mutual funds or in-
vestment bankers.3 9
He reasoned that since "the cases denying standing to competitors are
governed by (1) considerations of separation of powers, and (2) a desire
to limit actions against the government, rather than by rigid abstract
rules,"40 it should not be necessary to find that Congress intended to pro-
tect the particular plaintiff in order to grant standing. Rather, where
there was a proper plaintiff (one who is actually aggrieved and is an
appropriate party to vindicate the public interest) and a proper legal issue
(i.e., statutory construction as opposed to constitutional propriety of
legislation or government spending), it should be sufficient to find that
Congress did not intend to protect the administrative rulings from judicial
review.
38. See note 18 supra.
39. National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 420 F.2d 83, 99 (D.C. Cir.
1969).
40. Id. at 97.
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Judge Burger, writing for himself and Judge Miller, sought to re-
strict standing based upon "unlawful competition" to situations where
competition has been prohibited to protect those parties already pursuing
some activity, thereby excluding situations where "competition per se is
not proscribed but the very product which constitutes the competition is
in itself illegal."'" In his opinion, this latter form of unlawful competition
"finds no support in a close analysis of the myriad cases reviewing the
prerequisites to standing, is a misrepresentation of the conceptual genesis
of the theory of unlawful competition, and cannot support a claim of
standing."42 The reason that illegal conduct producing competition cannot
support a claim of standing, he argues, is that, in determining standing,
attention must be focused upon the party seeking to get his complaint
before the court and not upon the issues he seeks to have adjudicated.
After noting that the ICI had failed to establish its "own status as in-
tended statutory beneficiar [y] of a freedom from competition by national
banks,"43 he, nonetheless, agrees that the ICI has standing because of
"the need for judicial examination of the important questions raised."44
Judge Burger's startling conclusion, which is completely contrary
to the argument developed in his opinion, demonstrates the validity of
Judge Bazelon's premise that "to do justice to the subtleties of standing
as an element of justiciability" one must "acknowledge that cases denying
standing to competitors are governed by (1) considerations of separation
of powers, and (2) a desire to limit actions against the government,
rather than by rigid abstract rules... . ,,5 The body of Burger's opinion,
however, representing the views of a majority of this court, demonstrates
a tenacious desire to cling to those rigid abstract rules.
Even after finding standing based upon little more than "the need
for judicial examination of the important questions raised,"4 however,
the court properly refrained from any attempt to usurp administrative
functions.
The court and the regulatory agencies agreed that bank control of
mutual funds would create potential conflicts of interest. They approved
of the fund nevertheless, reasoning that the potential for abuse was no
greater than that which already exists in bank control of commingled
trust accounts of the traditional variety. 7 The court properly refused to
analyze the economic, political and social impact of permitting national
41. Id. at 102.
42. Id. at 102.
43. Id. at 105.
44. Id. at 108.
45. Id. at 97 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 108.
47. Common trust funds used for the administration of personal trusts and fiduciary
accounts for which the bank may be serving as trustee, executor, administrator, or guardian
have been regulated by a federal bank supervisory agency since 1937. These pooled funds
are specifically exempted in the provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940.
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banks to enhance their power through the domination of the practical
equivalent of mutual funds.
IV. POLICY
The determination of the limits to be placed on bank control of
commerce and industry is essentially an economic policy determination
better suited for Congress than the courts.
No attempt is made here to suggest limitations that should be im-
posed upon bank control of industrial or commercial corporations or even
to argue that the present regulation of bank activity is insufficient. It is
Congressional reluctance to investigate the increasing influence of banks
on the economy that this writer believes warrants criticism.
The reactions to the efforts of Representative Wright Patman" to
initiate thorough investigations have been shamefully inadequate. A study
conducted in response to the efforts of Representative Patman49 com-
pared the stockholdings of trust departments of 49 commercial banks
(four to six in each of ten metropolitan areas) with "The Fortune Di-
rectory of 500" largest U.S. corporations (which accounted for 70.5%
of all industrial profits during the year surveyed, 1966) and found, among
other things, that:
There are 176 separate instances involving 147 companies in
which these 49 banks hold 5 percent (determined by the sub-
committee to be the figure which generally indicated a bank
might have substantial influence or control over a corporation)
or more of the common stock of an individual company ...
These banks hold a total of 768 interlocking directorships with
286 of the 500 largest industrial corporations ... "
As startling as these statistics may seem, they prompted no immediate
response from Congress. Instead, the Senate extended for one year the
time in which the SEC is to study and make a report to Congress on
institutional investing practices in the securities market."
After pointing to numerous illegal bank-lobbying practices, Repre-
sentative Patman noted that five lobbyists, registered for The American
Bankers Association, reported spending only $190 to lobby during the
first six months of 1969, "a period of an extremely heavy run of banking
legislation in the Congress." '52 The House Banking and Currency Com-
mittee voted to block Chairman Patman from starting an investigation
of the banking lobby.5"
48. (D. Texas), Chairman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency.
49. STAFF OF THE SuBcom . ON DOMESTIC FINANCE, HOUSE CoMm. ON BANKING AND
CURRENCY, 90TH CoNG., 2D SESS. REPORT ON COMMERCIAL BANKS AND THEIR TRUST Acnrv-
nITs: EMERGING INLUENCE ON THE AMERICAN ECONOMY (1968).
so. Id. at 3.
51. S. REP'. No. 206, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1969).
52. WEEKLY REPORT, CONG. Q. 1814 (September 26, 1969).
S3. Id.
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Today, the flagrant abuses arising from the one-bank holding com-
panies have attracted the concern of Congress. While these abuses must
be rectified, legislation in this field will not eliminate the need to reeval-
uate all bank control of industry. The words of President Nixon con-
tained in a message accompanying his proposal to regulate one-bank hold-
ing companies apply to all bank control of commerce and industry:
"Left unchecked, the trend toward combining of banking and business
could lead to the formation of a relatively small number of power centers
dominating the American economy .... .54
By acceding to the discretion of the respective governmental reg-
ulatory agencies, the court in the instant case has increased the urgency
for congressional action.
ALLEN FULLER
NONJOINDER OF HUSBAND IN WIFE'S DEED:
APPLICABILITY OF ESTOPPEL
Real property was conveyed to the coplaintiff, a married woman,
who twice conveyed by deed this same tract of land without the joinder
of her husband as required by statute.1 The first deed, wherein the words
54. 5 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS No. 13, 61 (1969).
1. FLA. STAT. § 693.01 (1967): "Any married woman owning real property may sell,
convey or mortgage it as she might do if she were not married, provided her husband
join in such sale, conveyance or mortgage."
FLA. STAT. § 708.04 (1967): "The husband and wife shall join in all sales, transfers
and conveyances of the property of the wife, other than personal property and choses in
action."
FLA. STAT. § 708.08 (1967):
Every married woman is hereby empowered to take charge of, and manage
and control her separate property, to contract and to be contracted with, to sue
and be sued, and to sell, convey, transfer, mortgage, use and pledge her property,
real and personal, and to make, execute and deliver instruments and documents of
every character, without restraint, without the joinder or consent of her husband,
in all respects as fully as if she were unmarried. Every married woman, without the
joinder or consent of her husband, shall have and may exercise all rights and
powers with respect to her separate property, income and earnings, and may enter
into, obligate herself to perform, and enforce contracts or undertakings to the
same extent and in like manner as if she were unmarried; provided, however, that
no deed, mortgage or other instrument conveying or encumbering real property
owned by a married woman shall be valid without the joinder of her husband;
provided, further, that any claim or judgment against any married woman shall
not be a claim or lien against such married woman's inchoate right of dower in
her husband's separate property.
The purpose of having the husband join is said to be primarily for the protective
benefit of the wife and secondarily for the welfare of the husband by preventing the wife,
without his consent, from conveying real property which would be detrimental to the
welfare of their mutual marital interest. See In re Jensch, 134 So.2d 285 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1961).
Serious doubts as to the constitutionality of these statutes are raised by FLA. CONST.
art. X, § 5, as amended in 1968:
There shall be no distinction between married women and married men in
